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The Development of Competition in 





This paper examines the introduction of competition into the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry following privatisation of the 10 regional water authorities in 1989. It outlines 
the development of comparative, capital and product market competition, arguing that the greatest 
opportunities now lie with the last through the introduction of common carriage agreements, the 
extension of Inset appointments and the introduction of transferable abstraction licences. Despite 
competitive innovations, the industry remains highly regulated, complex and difficult to enter. One 
of Ofwat’s outstanding challenges for the next decade is to examine the means by which the 
regulatory burden might be lightened and barriers to entry lowered, to encourage potential entrants 
to compete with incumbents. 
JEL classification: L9. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1989 restructuring of the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry, 
and privatisation of the 10 regional water authorities (RWAs), was, arguably, 
one of the most technically challenging and politically ambitious projects 
undertaken by Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative government. With the exception of 
British Telecommunications (BT), British Gas and the British Airports Authority 
(BAA), all privatisations up to that point had involved companies subject to 
significant product market competition across most of their activities. In the case 
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of BT, its monopoly power was gradually being eroded by new entrants 
employing new technology. For British Gas, although the monopoly enjoyed by 
its distribution network company, TransCo, was secure, it faced competition 
from suppliers of alternative fuels such as electricity. For BAA, its local 
monopoly power was subject to competition from other modes of transport. 
However, the water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) — private sector 
successors to the RWAs — faced none of these competitive pressures. Instead, 
they enjoyed an unrivalled degree of monopoly power underpinned by the low 
substitutability of the services they offered and their ownership and control of 
water and sewerage networks.
1 
Historically, the two branches of the industry — water and sewerage — 
developed separately in England and Wales. Both were natural monopolies in 
their own right by virtue of their distinct distribution and collection networks. 
Unlike the electricity, gas and telecommunications utilities, no ‘national grid’ for 
either service emerged due to the prohibitively high cost of transporting heavy, 
non-compressible and potentially hazardous liquids over long distances. 
Nevertheless, by the middle of the twentieth century, a process of integration and 
consolidation had begun to gather momentum. This brought together many 
hundreds of independent water and sewerage bodies which had earlier secured 
the monopoly right to supply particular localities with one or both of these 
services. The process culminated in the reorganisation of the industry under the 
terms of the Water Act 1973 and led to the formation of 10 publicly owned 
multifunctional RWAs in 1974. 
The organising principle of ‘integrated river basin management’ endowed 
these new bodies with operational, environmental and regulatory functions, 
including responsibility for water supply, sewerage, sewage disposal, water 
resource planning, pollution control, fisheries, flood protection, water recreation 
and environmental conservation. However, the Act also preserved the position of 
29 private statutory companies that were permitted to continue to supply water, 
as agents of the RWAs, in their own areas. These water-only companies (WoCs) 
supplied around a quarter of the population. 
In 1986, Stephen Littlechild submitted a report to the Department of the 
Environment (Littlechild, 1986) in which he discussed the way that a privatised 
water and sewerage industry might be regulated. Given its status as ‘the natural 
monopoly par excellence’ (Littlechild, 1986, p. 5), he asserted that any transfer 
of public monopoly to the private sector would require a new, permanent 
regulatory settlement. The 1989 Water Act embraced this idea by creating a new 
economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), and by transferring 
the environmental regulatory functions of the RWAs to other bodies.
2 The 10 
RWAs were privatised and licensed to operate as WaSCs, whilst the 29 WoCs 
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— already privately owned — were also licensed and continued to operate in 
their respective areas. All 39 operators came under the economic regulatory 
auspices of Ofwat, headed by the Director General of Water Services, Ian Byatt. 
According to Littlechild, the need for permanent regulation did not rule out 
the possibility of competition within this industry: 
Competition is not an alternative to regulation of the water authorities, but it is an 
important complement which can facilitate the regulator’s task and provide added 
protection to customers. 
Littlechild, 1986, p. 1 
Three forms of competition, he believed, were possible: comparative (yardstick) 
competition, product market competition and capital market competition. The 
government, however, was not optimistic about the industry’s competitive 
potential, and limited one of the statutory duties of the Director General of Water 
Services to the facilitation rather than the promotion of competition.
3 This duty 
was weaker than that laid upon the Director Generals of Telecommunications 
and Gas.
4 Furthermore, the facilitation of competition was to be a secondary 
concern, ranking alongside the protection of customer interests and the 
promotion of economy and efficiency. The Director General’s primary duties 
were to ensure that the functions of water and sewerage undertakers were 
properly carried out and adequately financed. As the new regulatory regime 
matured, however, the government and Ofwat sought to explore actively the 
means by which industry operators might be exposed to competitive pressure.  
This paper examines the introduction of competition into the English and 
Welsh water and sewerage industry. It outlines its development and the role of 
the Director General of Water Services as facilitator. It moves on to analyse the 
policy’s effects, and concludes by considering the scope and prospects for 
competition in the future. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION 
One of the most significant challenges facing the newly appointed Director 
General of Water Services in 1989 was the lack of a comprehensive information 
infrastructure. Instead, Ofwat inherited responsibility for the economic 
regulation of an industry that possessed no centralised reporting mechanisms and 
no agreed set of technical definitions relating to even the most basic input and 
output measures. There was, within the industry, a culture of secrecy and a 
reluctance to share information borne of the protracted negotiations with 
government over the terms of the privatisation settlement (Sawkins, 1995). 
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Competition was well down the political policy agenda, and instead attention 
was focused on the delivery of the largest programme of capital investment ever 
undertaken by the industry.
5 To compound matters, there was uncertainty that the 
regulatory regime would prove to be stable or effective, as opposition parties 
made much of their policy promises to return the industry to public sector 
ownership and control. 
Ofwat quickly put in place reporting arrangements to enable it to monitor 
company activities. It consulted with the industry on the question of performance 
measurement, harmonising company definitions for output parameters such as 
‘water delivered’. It required companies to submit a comprehensive annual 
report of activities — the ‘July Return’ — and established a formal mechanism 
for reporting back — ‘Dear Managing Director’ letters. During his first year in 
post, it would have been possible for the Director General to focus his attention 
and the resources of his Office exclusively on these and other activities 
associated with his primary duties. However, in early policy statements, he 
signalled his willingness to explore, actively, the means by which this 
information might be used to facilitate competition within the industry.  
In the first Ofwat Annual Report (1989), Ian Byatt set out the general 
objective of his Office with respect to competition: 
Consumers cannot look to market mechanisms to protect them from unnecessarily high 
charges or poor service. My objective will be to achieve, through regulation, the same 
outcome as would normally arise from a competitive market. 
1989 Ofwat Annual Report, p. 11 
He enlarged on this, referring implicitly to each of the three forms of competition 
outlined by Littlechild (1986). On comparative and capital market competition, 
he noted their potential and drew attention to new statutory powers that 
permitted take-overs and mergers of water undertakings provided they did not 
unduly prejudice his ability to make valid comparisons. On product market 
competition, he outlined the possibility of making ‘Inset appointments’, where 
rival companies would be given the right to supply services on a greenfield site 
within an area already allocated to an existing appointee. It was not expected that 
progress would be equally rapid on all three fronts, however, and the Report 
made clear that the focus of Ofwat’s competitive activities would fall, initially, 
on comparative competition. 
1. Comparative Competition 
The origins of comparative competition may be traced to the bench-marking 
activities of public and private sector organisations seeking to calibrate their 
performance against that of their rivals. The idea was formalised, however, by 
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Shleifer in his seminal paper, ‘A theory of yardstick competition’ (Shleifer, 
1985), in which he modelled a situation where the price a regulated firm received 
for its services depended on the costs of identical firms in the same industry. In 
equilibrium, each firm found it optimal to choose a socially efficient level of cost 
reduction. This result was shown to generalise to cover the situation in which the 
industry was comprised of heterogeneous firms with observable differences.  
In his report on the economic regulation of privatised water authorities, 
Littlechild (1986) drew on this idea, stressing the potential for its application to 
an industry comprised of a series of regional monopolists (Littlechild, 1986, 
section 10.16). The idea was given statutory recognition in section 29 of the 
Water Act 1989, which required the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, in 
coming to a view on the desirability or otherwise of water industry take-overs or 
mergers, to take into account the effect such an action would have on the 
Director General’s ability to make comparisons between companies. 
Ofwat’s pragmatic approach to comparative competition was articulated with 
characteristic clarity by the Director General in the first Annual Report: 
I shall compare the performance of the 39 appointed companies and use the examples of 
the best to set standards for the others to introduce an element of comparative competition. 
Such comparisons will cover differences in operating cost, capital cost, levels of service 
and ‘customer care’. There will be allowances for differences, such as geographical 
conditions, which are outside the control of efficient managements. These comparisons will 
help me achieve a better deal for all water customers in England and Wales. 
1989 Ofwat Annual Report, p. 11 
The main obstacle to implementing this policy was the informational asymmetry 
between regulator and regulatees. The water companies effectively had a 
monopoly of operational information, which protected their position. 
Consequently, Ofwat gave priority to setting up reporting systems, establishing a 
common basis for measuring activities and arranging for the independent 
certification of all information supplied by the companies. These activities 
sought to reverse the gradual restriction in information availability that had 
occurred during the late 1980s. 
Under the terms of their new operating licences, companies were required to 
supply information annually on a specified series of Levels of Service Indicators. 
This information was published on a largely unattributable basis for the first time 
in October 1990 (Ofwat, 1990), but broken down by company in the following 
year. Meanwhile, the scope of the July Return of information by companies to 
Ofwat was widened substantially in 1991 (and in later years) to include more 
details of operating costs, capital investment and efficiency. In June 1992, Ofwat 
published summary data in anonymous format on the amount of water delivered 
to customers and the unit costs of doing so (Ofwat, 1992a). The first attributable 
information of this sort entered the public domain in November 1992 (Ofwat, Fiscal Studies 
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1992b). From that point on, progress was rapid as the scope and quality of 
comparative information that was made publicly available increased; new 
measures were reported
6 and others were refined or replaced. In December 1995, 
the Director General placed the whole July Return for each company, with the 
exception of a small amount of commercially confidential information, in the 
Ofwat library for public inspection. This information is now made available on 
CD-ROM as a matter of routine and stands as evidence of the way in which 
Ofwat has sought to break the water companies’ informational monopoly.  
Allied to Ofwat’s efforts to extend the scope and quality of reported 
information has been its analytical work, aimed, primarily, at comparing 
company performance. Early attempts were hindered by uncertainty over 
parameter definitions and data quality. Nevertheless, Ofwat was not deterred 
from using raw unit-cost information at the outset. This was initially employed 
not as a basis for explicit relative efficiency judgements but as a means of 
eliciting justifications from particular companies for their high unit costs
7 and 
thereby goading them into improving their performance. 
The establishment of an Ofwat technical sub-group to advise on modelling 
methodology resulted in further refinements to the July Return. In July 1992, 
information relating to company operating conditions was gathered and 
subsequently used in a research paper (Ofwat, 1993a) that sought to identify the 
most significant factors in explaining variations in the cost of operations. 
Subsequent reports written by Professor Mark Stewart of the University of 
Warwick (Ofwat, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b and 1994c) employed conventional 
econometric techniques to model 1992–93 operating costs for water, sewerage 
and sewage treatment. Ofwat used the results to place individual companies 
within broad operating-cost ‘efficiency bands’. 
The results of these and other comparative efficiency studies fed into the 
Periodic Review of water company price caps in 1994.
8 However, their role was 
as corroborative evidence to be used in conjunction with basic unit-cost data. 
The limitations of techniques such as stochastic frontier function estimation 
employed in the commissioned research reports were recognised by Ofwat. 
Consequently, the results of this analysis were used once again, primarily, to 
prompt companies to explain why their performance measures were out of line 
with industry comparators: 
The ability to compare the costs of water and sewerage companies, however, is particularly 
valuable in assessing the scope for high-cost companies to reduce their costs ... At the 
Periodic Review, the onus of proof will be on high-cost companies to explain their costs.  
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Water delivered and sewage collected are the two most appropriate summary measures of 
the services provided by the water and sewerage companies. Efficiency comparisons will 
therefore begin with the unit costs of water delivered and sewage collected. 
1993 Ofwat Annual Report, pp. 61–2 
In the wake of the first Periodic Review, further analytical work was 
commissioned. The portfolio of comparative performance measurement 
techniques used by Ofwat was extended to include variations on standard 
econometric approaches, linear programming studies employing methods such as 
data envelopment analysis, and standard inter- and intra-industry bench-marking 
techniques.
9 An important aspect of the more recent total comparative efficiency 
measurement research programme was the work examining the future scope for 
efficiency improvements within the industry. Work by the Babtie Group and 
Europe Economics (Ofwat, 1998b), for example, suggested that there was scope 
for annual efficiency savings of 1–2 per cent in capital expenditure and 2.5–3.5 
per cent in operating expenditure over the next five years. Allied to this has been 
Ofwat’s desire to derive robust estimates of long-run marginal costs as a means 
of informing pricing policy (Ofwat, 1999b). Early estimates showed considerable 
inter-industry variation, and companies were initially reluctant to publish either 
their methodology or their raw data. Once again, Ofwat overcame these 
objections, and it put this important comparative information into the public 
domain for the first time in its 1999–2000 report on tariff structure and charges 
(Ofwat, 1999d). All this new comparative information fed into the 1999 Periodic 
Price Review. 
Over the past 10 years, therefore, the two main technical means by which 
Ofwat has stimulated pseudo-competitive behaviour between firms in the 
industry have been the publication of comparative information and the 
dissemination of the results of analytical work. However, this approach has been 
criticised on the grounds that Levels of Service Indicators, for example, may 
prove less informative once all companies achieve a certain level of 
performance. Furthermore, their focus is exclusively quantitative, as is the focus 
of most of the analytical work to date. The way in which qualitative aspects of 
company operations may be incorporated into Ofwat’s performance 
measurement programme is, therefore, one of the main technical challenges for 
the future. 
Meanwhile, Ofwat remains convinced that comparative competition has been 
an effective means of goading companies into wringing inefficiencies out of 
their operations: 
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We use comparative competition as our main vehicle for improving company performance. 
It encourages companies to provide a better service at lower cost. Comparative competition 
stimulates the behaviour that market competition might produce. 
1998 Ofwat Annual Report, p. 22 
Undoubtedly, the publication of comparative information has revealed disparities 
between companies and the opportunities for arbitrage of various forms. Capital 
market competition through take-overs and mergers is one way in which these 
opportunities have been taken up. 
2. Take-Overs and Mergers 
The Water Act 1989 did not prohibit the take-over of a water company by 
another enterprise. There were, however, two qualifications to this general rule.  
First was the case where the take-over involved a merger with another UK 
water company. If the proposed merger involved a company with assets valued at 
under £30 million, the proposal would be considered under the normal 
provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973. If the value of the assets to be taken 
over and the value of those already owned by the bidder both exceeded 
£30 million, reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was 
mandatory. In coming to a decision, a significant new provision was that the 
MMC was required to have regard to the principle that the Director General’s 
ability to make comparisons between water companies should not be impaired.
10 
Other mergers involving target water companies whose assets were worth at least 
£70 million might be referred to the MMC at the discretion of the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry under the Fair Trading Act 1973. 
Second, special or ‘golden’ shares were issued for each of the 10 WaSCs. 
These were held by the Secretaries of State for the Environment and Wales, and 
they limited shareholders in these companies to a maximum 15 per cent stake for 
a period of five years. This was aimed at giving the industry a period of stability 
to permit the WaSCs to meet their environmental objectives. On 31 December 
1994, nine of the 10 special shares were redeemed at par. The restriction 
remained in place for Welsh Water for reasons of national identity. 
As with comparative competition, Ofwat was keen to exploit the potential of 
capital market competition delivered through take-over and merger activity. 
Gradually, it became clear to industry analysts that the initial regulatory 
settlement had been extremely generous to the companies, an impression 
confirmed when most companies, under pressure from Ofwat, were able to hold  
 
                                                                                                                                    
10Section 29 Water Act 1989, amended by section 34(3)(a) Water Industry Act 1991, in turn amended by 















No  1% from April 1991 
        
Severn Trent  1 September 1993  Severn Trent Water 
East Worcester 
No  15% over three years 
(EW area only) 
        
Essex & Suffolk  31 March 1994  Essex Water 
Suffolk Water 
No None 
        
Three Valleys  31 March 1994  Colne Valley 
Lee Valley 
Rickmansworth 
Yes  9% for combined 
company over six 
years 
        
South East Water  1 April 1994  Eastbourne 
Mid Sussex 
West Kent 
No  2.7% for combined 
company over one 
year 
        
Bournemouth & 
West Hants 




No  0.8% for combined 
company over four 
years 
        
Sutton & East 
Surrey Water 
1 April 1996  East Surrey Water 
Sutton & District 
No  3.5% over three years 
5% best endeavours 
        
Northumbrian  1 April 1996  Northumbrian 
Water 
North East Water 
Yes  15% over six years 
(merged water 
revenue only) 
        
Dee Valley  1 April 1998  Chester 
Waterworks 
Wrexham Water 
No  3.5% by 1 April 
2001 
        
South East  1 January 1999  Mid Southern 
South East 
No 0.5% 
        
Anglian  1 April 2000  Anglian 
Hartlepool 
No — 
        
Yorkshire  1 April 2000  Yorkshire 
York Waterworks 
No  15% (YW area only) 
        
Northumbrian  1 April 2000  Northumbrian 
Essex & Suffolk 
No — 
        
Three Valleys  1 October 2000  Three Valleys 
North Surrey 
No — 
Source: Various Ofwat News Releases. Fiscal Studies 
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price increases well below those permitted by their price caps.
11 The improved 
quality and quantity of comparative information allowed predators to identify 
potential take-over targets and assess whether profitable opportunities existed. 
Once take-overs had been approved, it was generally the case that 
negotiations would begin between Ofwat and the new owners to arrange a single 
licence or appointment for the newly merged company. Therefore the date of 
take-over generally preceded the date on which a single licence was granted by 
months or years.
12 Table 1 lists the successful mergers between water enterprises 
to date. 
The first wave of take-over and merger activity was undertaken by French 
multinationals that had acquired large shareholdings in many statutory water 
companies in the late 1980s. For example, Lyonnaise UK plc, a subsidiary of 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, consolidated the operations of Newcastle and Gateshead 
Water and Sunderland and South Shields Water with the creation of North East 
Water in November 1990. Although the merger did not qualify for an automatic 
reference to the MMC, agreement was reached with Ofwat to reduce charges by 
1 per cent across the area. In the case of the Three Valleys Water Company 
created from the Lee Valley, Colne Valley and Rickmansworth water companies, 
an MMC inquiry did take place. The MMC report (MMC, 1990) concluded that, 
whilst the merger would operate against the public interest by reducing the 
number of comparators available to the Director General, the adverse effects 
could be mitigated if the benefits of merger were passed on to customers in the 
form of lower charges. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry allowed the 
merger to proceed provided General Utilities plc — a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Compagnie Générale des Eaux and the majority shareholder in the Lee Valley 
Water Company — reduced charges by 9 per cent across the Three Valleys area. 
These two examples illustrate the Ofwat policy towards small company 
mergers, articulated in its 1989 Annual Report: 
Mergers between existing water enterprises in the UK and the integration of their 
management would reduce the number of comparators and prejudice my ability to make 
valid comparisons. I recognise, however, that there may be public benefits which could 
outweigh such a detriment. In such circumstances I would generally wish to see a single 
new appointment for merged or jointly managed companies with a new price limit (K) for 
that company. 
1989 Ofwat Annual Report, p. 11 
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27/92, 16 October 1992, ‘Most water companies settle for lower charges next year’). 
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TABLE 2 
Merger References to the Monopolies and Mergers (Competition) Commission 










State for Trade 
and Industry 
General Utilities plc / 
The Colne Valley Water 
Company and Rickmansworth 
Water Company 
7.9.89 27.4.90  Yes  Yes 
       
General Utilities plc / 
The Mid Kent Water Company 
4.1.90 4.7.90 Yes  No 
       
Southern Water plc / 
Mid-Sussex Water Company 
4.1.90 4.7.90 No  Yes 
       
Lyonnaise des Eaux SA / 
Northumbrian Water Group plc 
31.3.95 26.7.95 Yes  Yes 
       
Severn Trent plc / 
South West Water plc 
21.5.96 25.10.96  Yes  No 
       
Wessex Water plc / 
South West Water plc 
21.5.96 25.10.96  Yes  No 
       
Mid Kent Holdings plc / 
General Utilities plc / 
SAUR Water Services plc 
23.5.96 21.1.97 Yes  No 
 
It was not always the case, however, that an accommodation could be reached. In 
the case of Mid Kent Water, two separate references to the MMC in 1990 and 
1996 (see Table 2) resulted in possible take-overs by General Utilities plc and 
SAUR being blocked. In both cases, the MMC was not persuaded that any price 
reduction would be sufficient to remedy the expected detriment of the merger to 
Ofwat’s system of comparative competition. This finding underpinned the action 
of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in blocking both bids. 
A second wave of take-over activity was precipitated by the expiry of the 
government’s ‘golden share’ in the WaSCs in December 1994. Two of the 
smallest WaSCs — Northumbrian and South West — were quickly targeted, 
leading in each case to an MMC reference (see Table 2). Final decisions by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry once again turned on whether Ofwat’s 
ability to make comparisons would be prejudiced unduly. In the case of 
Northumbrian, the potential partner, Lyonnaise UK, already owned North East 
Water, which operated exclusively within Northumbrian’s area. Despite the loss 
of a water comparator, however, the merger was allowed to proceed on the 
grounds that a 15 per cent price reduction for water services would be delivered Fiscal Studies 
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over six years. Crucial to this decision was the fact that Lyonnaise UK did not 
own or control any of the other combined WaSCs, and the number of sewerage 
comparators would therefore be unaffected. In contrast, proposals by Wessex 
Water and Severn Trent to merge with South West Water were blocked. If 
allowed to proceed, either merger would have reduced the number of separately 
owned companies delivering sewerage (and water) services from 10 to nine. In 
the MMC report on the proposed Severn Trent–South West Water merger, the 
importance of ownership diversity for effective comparative competition was 
discussed: 
The DGWS [Director General of Water Services] also told us that a diversity of ownership 
of water companies was likely to secure the greatest variety of management styles and 
techniques. The industry was more diverse than it had been under public ownership and 
companies had continued to differentiate themselves one from another in the sector. 
Experience had shown that differences in performance were fundamentally affected by 
differences in management style and priorities, which were themselves driven by 
differences in ownership. The more independent companies that were able to take part in 
this process, the more effective comparative competition would be. Separate Appointments 
in the hands of a common owner were a poor substitute for separate ownership; for 
example, the DGWS told us that each of the French Groups (General Utilities, SAUR and 
Lyonnaise) had their own management style which permeated the whole group. This 
overall management style tended to impose uniformity on the performance of the individual 
companies in the group, reducing their value as comparators. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1996, p. 14 
In addition to mergers between water enterprises, other utility operators 
sought potential partners in this sector. In the instances involving electricity 
suppliers, Ofwat and the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) issued joint 
consultation papers and advised the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry of 
the implications of sanctioning the creation of ‘multiutilities’. It was generally 
the case that the mergers were allowed to proceed subject to minor amendments 
to operating licences. Water–electricity partnerships were the most popular: 
North West Water joined with Norweb to form United Utilities, Welsh Water 
acquired SWALEC and Southern Water was taken over by Scottish Power. 
The examples discussed above are representative of the competitive activity 
in the water industry capital market since 1989. This activity continues; 
however, Ofwat has signalled its reluctance to contemplate any merger of 
WaSCs and indeed any further reduction in the number of water-only companies 
remaining. The 1995 Ofwat Annual Report set out in tabular form a ‘spectrum of 
detriments’ from mergers (see Table 3). 
It remains possible that the surviving WoCs will finally be absorbed by the 
WaSCs in whose area they operate, particularly if by doing so they act as a new  
 English and Welsh Water and Sewerage Industry 
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TABLE 3 
Spectrum of Detriments from Water Mergers 
Most harmful  Merger of two contiguous water and sewerage companies 
Merger of two non-contiguous water and sewerage companies 
Merger of two independently controlled large companies in the same region 
Merger of two large companies in different regions 
 
Merger of a large company with a small company 
Least harmful  Merger of two neighbouring small companies 
Source: 1995 Ofwat Annual Report, p. 32. 
 
exemplary comparator in terms of efficiency. However, the emergence of 
product market competition may prove to be the catalyst that will reverse the 
trend that has seen the number of independent water enterprises operating under 
independent licences reduce from 39 in 1989 to just 27 a decade later. 
3. Product Market Competition 
(a) Inset Appointments 
One of the most radical innovations of the 1989 Water Act was its opening-up of 
the possibility of product market competition within the industry. The main 
vehicle for this was to be the ‘Inset appointment’ — an agreement whereby one 
company would be given the right to supply services within another’s statutory 
area. The Act limited Inset opportunities to sites not receiving a service from an 
existing undertaker (‘greenfield sites’) which were located more than 30 metres 
distant from the incumbent undertaker’s main or sewer. However, although the 
Act ended the right of companies to act as regional monopolists in principle, in 
practice product market competition of this form was very slow to develop. 
The main practical obstacle to Insets at the start arose as follows. For Inset 
applicants to be successful, they were under an obligation to demonstrate to the 
Director General that they had enough water available to supply customers. 
However, they were not permitted to apply for bulk supplies from other 
companies until they had been appointed undertakers for the relevant areas. This 
and other practical obstacles led to new legislative provisions contained in the 
Water Industry Act 1991 (sections 7 and 8) as amended by the Competition and 
Service (Utilities) Act 1992 (section 40).  
The outcome of these changes in the law was to enlarge the scope for product 
market competition, making Inset appointments possible in respect of all 
greenfield sites and all sites where existing customers were supplied with 250 
megalitres or more of water a year.
13 Crucially, Inset applicants were given the 
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right to apply to existing undertakers for bulk supplies of water and for mains 
sewerage connections in advance of appointments being made. In cases where a 
potential appointee was unable to obtain the necessary supplies of water or 
access to sewage treatment facilities from an existing appointee, the Director 
General was given the right to determine the price and the other terms of supply. 
Inset appointments could also be granted if an incumbent consented to change its 
boundary to allow part of its area to be transferred to another undertaker. 
However, Insets could not be used as a device for taking over the whole of 
another undertaker’s area.  
Despite these changes, the Inset appointment process remained lengthy and 
involved. Delicate negotiations between applicants, customers, incumbents and 
Ofwat were often frustrated by a reluctance on the part of rival companies to 
share commercially sensitive information. The 1995 Ofwat publication 
Competition in the Water Industry: Inset Appointments and their Regulation 
sought to clarify the criteria and process for applying for Inset appointments, 
estimating that applications would take approximately 23 weeks to process. This 
proved to be extremely optimistic. 
By June 1994, just two Inset applications had been received. It was not until 
May 1997 that the Director General granted the first Inset appointment, almost 
eight years after the principle had been established in statute. Under the new 
agreement, Buxted Chickens Ltd became a customer of Anglian rather than 
Essex and Suffolk Water. Company licences were altered and a new 3.5km 
dedicated pipeline constructed to link the site with an Anglian water main. The 
first Inset sewerage agreement was also entered into by Anglian, which took over 
provision of sewerage services on the former RAF Finningley site in March 
1998. Later that year, Ofwat published proposals to allow Hartlepool Water to 
supply a greenfield site in Northumbrian’s area.
14 This first Inset application for 
an undeveloped site was finally granted in February 1999. 
Revised Inset appointment guidelines were issued by Ofwat in February 1999 
(Ofwat, 1999a), including a new timetable, which predicted a 16- to 30-week 
period for the whole Inset process. The new guidelines emphasised the need for 
greater transparency in the exchange of price, cost and tariff information and 
encouraged potential applicants to discuss their intended actions with Ofwat at 
an early stage. Amongst the changes aimed at reducing regulatory transactions 
costs was the Director General’s decision not to set a price cap for new Inset 
appointees but merely to ensure that the customer was left no worse off than if it 
had remained with the previous supplier. Overall, the aim of the new guidelines 
was to encourage transparent negotiations and thereby lower entry barriers for 
prospective competitors. 
                                                                                                                                    
14Ofwat Press Notice 43/98, 26 October 1998, ‘Ofwat publishes proposals to allow water company to supply 
new development in another’s area’. English and Welsh Water and Sewerage Industry 
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In March 1999, Albion Water (Shotton) Ltd was granted a licence and 
became the first new entrant to the industry since privatisation, replacing Dwr 
Cymru (Welsh Water) as Shotton Paper’s supplier of water services. Under the 
terms of the agreement, Albion, a subsidiary of Enviro-Logic Ltd, acted as an 
intermediary, buying water from the incumbent Welsh Water and delivering it to 
Shotton. This arbitrage arrangement is typical of the agreements agreed or being 
negotiated at present.
15 
Most recently, on 17 August 2000, regulations came into force that lowered 
the Inset appointment threshold to 100 megalitres per year for companies in 
England. Ofwat estimates that this will permit more than a thousand additional 
users to apply for Inset appointments. 
(b) Other Forms of Product Market Competition 
Several other forms of product market competition are permitted under current 
legislation: first, cross-border supplies. The Competition and Service (Utilities) 
Act 1992 gave customers the right to demand a supply of water to be used for 
domestic purposes from any undertaker irrespective of where they live. The 
customer is obliged, however, to meet the costs of making any necessary 
connections. Clearly, the option is unattractive at present for the vast majority of 
domestic users, although customers living near the border of two competing 
suppliers might be in a position to benefit from a change in supplier.
16 At 
present, there are no instances of domestic cross-border supplies. In May 2000, 
however, Thames Water announced its commitment to provide a cross-border 
supply of water to Brands Hatch motor racing circuit. Projected customer 
savings are judged to be of the order of 20 per cent. Second, it is open to 
customers to buy water and sewerage services from private operators that 
develop new sources and that do not come under the economic regulatory 
auspices of Ofwat. These companies are permitted to negotiate prices without 
constraint, but always subject to meeting minimum quality standards. Third, 
companies are permitted to subject many of their functions to market 
competition via competitive tendering procedures. In theory, for example, some 
operational functions could be subcontracted to other suppliers. The basic 
requirement is that licensed operators must retain sufficient control of operations 
to ensure they deliver a proper service to their customers whilst meeting 
environmental obligations. 
To this list must now be added common carriage — the shared use of the 
supply pipes and other infrastructure of an existing statutory undertaker by a 
third party in order to enable the third party to provide services within the 
                                                                                                                                    
15By 31 March 2000, six Inset appointments had been made and eight other applications registered with Ofwat. 
16The boundaries between the WaSCs generally follow divisions between watersheds such as ridges, hills or 
mountains. Pumping water across watershed boundaries is very costly. Fiscal Studies 
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incumbent’s area. This is, arguably, one of the most controversial and potentially 
far-reaching consequences of the Competition Act 1998.  
The Act, which came into force on 1 March 2000, prohibits companies 
entering into agreements that are anti-competitive, i.e. that prevent, restrict or 
distort competition in the UK. It also prohibits abuse of a dominant market 
position, a provision which may provide an effective legal framework for the 
development of common carriage. For example, if, by denying access to 
infrastructure assets, such as mains or sewers, an incumbent company excludes a 
potential competitor unreasonably, the competitor may make a complaint of anti-
competitive behaviour to the Director General of Water Services or the Director 
General of Fair Trading. A company’s access prices may be considered 
unreasonable if it treats new entrants differently from the way it treats itself or if 
it discriminates unduly between different entrants. It may refuse to offer terms, 
or offer anti-competitive terms. If a breach of the Act has taken place, the 
Director General of Water Services can direct a company to change its conduct 
and, if appropriate, impose financial penalties of up to 10 per cent of the 
offender’s UK turnover per year. All decisions under the Act are subject to 
appeal to the Competition Commission. 
Guidelines on how the Act will operate were published jointly by Ofwat and 
the Office of Fair Trading (Office of Fair Trading, 2000). These emphasise the 
importance of ensuring that the competitive process is unhindered and note that 
the Director General of Water Services may investigate breaches of the Act on 
his own initiative. Guidance on how companies should deal with drinking water 
quality aspects of common carriage were issued separately by the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2000). Significantly, the 
Inspectorate was of the view that public health and environmental concerns were 
not a barrier to common carriage operations. Ofwat’s approach to the 
administration of the Act was summarised in a series of Dear Managing Director 
letters.
17 
In coming to a view as to whether a company has behaved anti-competitively, 
Ofwat is constrained to act in a way that is consistent with all its statutory duties. 
It must be satisfied, for example, that common carriage arrangements do not lead 
to an unsatisfactory level of service or jeopardise an incumbent’s ability to 
finance and carry out its functions. In determining charges, Ofwat must avoid 
‘undue preference’ between customers, and in particular must protect the interest 
of rural customers. This is a complex balancing act. For, as product market 
competition develops through common carriage arrangements, cross-subsidies 
will unwind further and charges become more cost-reflective. Any competitive 
initiatives involving further regional de-averaging of prices must remain 
consistent with the Director General’s duty to protect the interests of all classes 
of customers. The scope and potential for the development of further product 
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market competition will continue, therefore, to be constrained by this wider 
regulatory framework. It may be many months or even years before the first 
common carriage agreements are finalised and this new form of product market 
competition realised. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION: AN ASSESSMENT 
There is little doubt that these advances in competition would not have come 
about but for the commitment of the first Director General of Ofwat, Ian Byatt, 
to the policy. Throughout his time in office, he confirmed in public statements 
his belief in its efficacy as a means of delivering benefits to water company 
customers. The following recent statement is typical: 
Comparative competition has served the customer well. They can now expect — and 
receive — better service than ever before. Comparative competition has reduced 
companies’ costs and, as a result, prices will be lower for customers. Inset appointments 
have had a trickle-down effect with benefits extending to the next tiers of customers. ... 
Parliament requires water–water mergers to be referred to the Competition Commission. 
The bottom line is that we should not have such mergers without counterbalancing and 
overwhelming benefits to customers. 
Ofwat Press Notice PN32/99
18 
It remains difficult, however, to quantify the effect of Ofwat’s pro-competitive 
stance in the absence of an appropriate comparator group of companies operating 
within a similar institutional setting. Nevertheless, there is some empirical 
evidence available that might be brought to bear on the question of the efficacy 
of competition. 
1. The Effect of Comparative Competition 
From the beginning, comparative competition was, undoubtedly, one of the most 
effective regulatory devices at Ofwat’s disposal. The early publication and 
dissemination of comparative statistics served to inform key industry 
stakeholders of the relative positions of individual companies along several 
dimensions of performance. Armed with this information, the stakeholders — 
regulators, water company customers, shareholders and the government — began 
to seek explanations from individual organisations regarding the gross disparities 
in operational performance. This, in turn, prompted the companies to reallocate 
resources towards those dimensions of performance that were measured and 
reported. Consequently, the range and variance of these measures reduced as the  
 
                                                                                                                                    
1830 June 1999, ‘Customers can reap benefits of competition now says Ian Byatt’ (extract from a speech to the 
European Policy Forum’s Pro-Competition Round Table on 29 June 1999).  
 
TABLE 4 
Total Industry Performance 
Per cent 




















DG2  Properties at risk of low 
pressure 
1.85 1.69 1.27 1.02 0.81 0.78 0.43 0.25 0.17 0.13 
DG3  Properties subject to 
unplanned supply 
interruptions of 12 hours 
or more 
0.42 0.20 0.38 0.35 0.26 0.58 0.21 0.15 0.05 0.06 
DG4  Population subject to 
hosepipe bans 
41 13 12  0  3  39 30  3  3  0 
DG5  Properties subject to 
sewer flooding incidents 
    0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
DG5  Properties at risk of 
flooding from sewers 
once every 10 years 
0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
DG6  Billing contacts not 
responded to within five 
working days 
31.18 30.49 20.15 16.27 11.05 10.00  8.16  4.74  2.53  1.52 
DG7  Written complaints not 
responded to within 10 
working days 
31.09 25.64 18.14 24.12  5.48  5.79  5.07  1.99  1.28  0.64 
DG8  Bills not based on meter 
readings 
      3.67  2.32  0.88  0.34  0.33 
DG9 Received  telephone calls 
not answered within 30 
seconds 
       26.97  18.76  9.70  9.29 
Source: Ofwat, 2000a, Table 1, p. 6. English and Welsh Water and Sewerage Industry 
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new regulatory regime matured. Table 4 illustrates this process at the industry 
level for the key performance indicators specified in company licences. The 
same pattern is observable in the disaggregated company-level data, where the 
gap between the best- and the worst-performing companies along the various 
dimensions has steadily narrowed throughout the last decade.
19 
At the same time, the Director General was aware that improvements in 
measured aspects of performance sometimes brought about a deterioration in the 
unmeasured aspects. Ofwat responded to this problem by phasing in new 
performance indicators or refining those already in use. To date, however, it has 
proved reluctant to drop any but the most peripheral indicators within its 
package. 
Other instances of the way in which Ofwat has goaded companies into 
improving their performance may be offered. In each case, comparative 
information has been used by the regulators and other interest groups such as 
politicians, customers or the press to exert pressure on poorly performing 
companies to modify their behaviour. Comparative statistics relating to leakage, 
disconnections and unit costs have enabled Ofwat — in the first instance — to 
identify underperforming companies. Armed with information supplied by other 
companies, it has then been possible to set challenging but realistic targets for 
improvement and to track progress towards meeting those targets consistently.
20 
Overall, although the prominence given to comparative competition by Ofwat 
has diminished slightly in recent years, there is no question of it abandoning this 
regulatory tool. Having served as a means by which the gross inefficiencies have 
been wrung out of the industry, it continues to provide valuable insights into 
company operations. 
2. The Effect of Capital Market Competition 
In general terms, capital market competition might be expected to reduce X-
inefficiency within a company, drive down costs and thereby reduce the 
possibility of take-over by a hostile predator. Isolating and measuring the effects 
of this form of competition is, however, problematic. For the English and Welsh 
water industry, it is further complicated by the legislative and regulatory 
antipathy towards water–water mergers in cases where important comparators 
are involved.  
The threat of merger or take-over has, however, prompted companies to offer 
price reductions to customers. This implies reduced revenue and operating profit 
unless efficiency gains are made. Price reductions are, therefore, a crude proxy 
for the effect capital market competition has on particular firms within the 
industry, if it is assumed that they would not have been offered in the absence of 
take-over or merger activity. A leading example of this in England and Wales 
                                                                                                                                    
19See, for example, Ofwat (2000a, Table 5, p. 15). 
20See, for example, Ofwat (1998c). Fiscal Studies 
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was South West Water’s announcement of a £15 customer rebate and 20.4 per 
cent increase in interim dividends during its 1996 defence of hostile take-over 
bids from Severn Trent and Wessex Water. In the end, the bids were blocked by 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The threat of take-over, however, 
was enough to induce South West to put its management under considerable 
pressure to make good the reduction in profit that resulted from the customer 
rebate. Table 1 sets out other price reductions agreed between the water 
companies and Ofwat in cases where mergers have been sanctioned. 
As the number of independent companies within the industry has declined 
and the regulator has indicated reservations over the consolidation of WaSCs 
(Table 3), the potential for domestic capital market competition to elicit further 
efficiency improvements has been diminished. Only product market competition 
now appears to have the potential to give competition new momentum. 
3. The Effect of Product Market Competition 
The possibility of Inset appointments began a process that made the commercial 
and domestic water markets in England and Wales more contestable. This has 
had two main effects.  
First, companies have introduced large-user tariffs, for potable water, waste 
water and trade effluent. The numbers doing so have increased slowly as the 
procedures for Insets have become less cumbersome in the wake of the 
Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992. In 1993–94, North West and East 
Surrey pioneered separate tariffs for a class of large industrial customers. 
Anglian, Severn Trent and Essex & Suffolk followed in 1994–95. In these and 
other cases, revisions to the tariff structure were made before the first Inset 
appointment had been confirmed. Clearly, the threat of competition had an effect 
on the companies and led them to modify their behaviour. As at May 2000, all 
but two companies operating under separate licences had large-user tariffs for 
water. Seven of the 10 WaSCs offered large-user waste water tariffs and four 
offered lower tariffs to large trade effluent customers.  
All of these tariffs are structured so as to avoid giving customers the 
incentive to waste water. Most operate with a high fixed charge and a low 
volumetric rate, whilst the minority have a lower volumetric rate for all 
consumption over a certain threshold. Ofwat’s key operating principle is that 
prices must not be driven below the long-run marginal costs of supply, which 
include incremental capital costs (see Ofwat (1997)). Prices, in other words, 
must reflect costs imposed at the margin. 
The second effect of product market competition has come about as a direct 
result of the introduction of large-user tariffs. By 1999, Ofwat judged that the 
market for large users was sufficiently contestable to enable it to remove them 
from the regulated tariff basket. The licences of all companies except Sutton and 
East Surrey Water were amended to remove customers using not less than 250 English and Welsh Water and Sewerage Industry 
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megalitres per year from the tariff basket with effect from 1 April 2000. The 
same licence modification applies to Sutton & East Surrey from April 2001. 
Ofwat explained the decision in the following way: 
Taking large users out of the tariff basket means that companies cannot automatically 
recoup from other customers lost revenue arising from reduced charges to their large users. 
These large users are part of a competitive market that does not require the same degree of 
regulation as other groups of customers. Notwithstanding this, companies must ensure that 
charges to these large users should not be unduly preferential or unduly discriminatory. 
They must also ensure that they are not acting anti-competitively. 
Ofwat, 2000b, p. 60 
Removal from the tariff basket does not mean, therefore, that these prices will 
completely escape Ofwat’s regulatory control. 
4. Regulatory Involvement 
One of the ironies of Ofwat’s duty to facilitate competition has been the growth 
in the scale and scope of its involvement with the industry and therefore its size 
(Table 5). The amount of information gathered for monitoring purposes has 
grown unremittingly as the suite of performance indicators has expanded, 
placing a particularly heavy burden on the smaller companies. In addition, 
further substantial informational demands are made as part of the Periodic 
Review process every five years.
21 
It may be argued that an early expansion of regulatory activity was necessary 
to take control of an industry that was exploiting the generous post-privatisation 
regulatory settlement. Much early groundwork was also necessary to put in place 
robust and reliable reporting systems that would deliver timely information of a 
high quality. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest a scaling-down of 
regulatory activities in the near future, which would be the logical concomitant 
of increased competition.  Initiatives such as the removal of large-user tariffs 
from the tariff basket, although symbolically important, have not, apparently, 
turned the tide of regulatory expansion. 
TABLE 5 
Ofwat Staff 
  1990 1991 1992 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of staff  51  112  132  194  190  206  220 
Source: Various Ofwat Annual Reports. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
21In its evaluation of the 1994 Periodic Review, Ofwat reported that the companies had noted an incongruity 
between the volume of data they were asked to submit and the information supplied by Ofwat to support its 
decisions. Fiscal Studies 
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IV. THE SCOPE OF AND PROSPECTS FOR COMPETITION 
Over the last 10 years, most regulatory effort has been invested in the 
development of the comparative and capital market forms of competition. Such 
initiatives are now largely played out, and, with the passing of the Competition 
Act 1998, the focus of attention has shifted towards product market competition. 
As yet, however, barriers to entry remain high in the industry, and the 
opportunities for this form of competition are still rather few and far between.  
The government and Ofwat, believing that only product market competition 
now has the potential to give competition new momentum, have sought to 
nurture this tender plant carefully. As in the gas and electricity industries, 
competition has been rolled out in stages, starting with the largest customers. 
The recent lowering of the Inset threshold indicates a willingness to follow this 
pattern, gradually extending the benefits of choice to smaller users. To date, 
there has been no mass switching of supplier by customers. But the potential for 
switching has undoubtedly focused corporate minds, prompting water companies 
to introduce new tariffs tailored to suit large users. Nevertheless, it remains 
uncertain whether customers will switch or threaten to switch supplier in 
sufficient numbers to generate critical mass to ensure that the momentum of 
product market competition will be preserved. 
Undoubtedly, the survival chances of product market competition were 
boosted by the Competition Act 1998 (CA98). This and the associated debate 
over common carriage have led to an important change in attitude within the 
industry towards competition in general: 
Even as little as two years ago, most water companies adopted a neutral or defensive 
attitude to competition. In particular, the concept of competition through shared use of 
networks, which had been so significant in electricity and gas, was not actively considered 
in water. ... The consensus seemed to be that there would never be a significant level of 
market competition in the water industry. Now there has been a marked change in attitude. 
More companies positively seek out competitive opportunities. ... The introduction of 
CA98 has been significant in changing attitudes. It has strengthened considerably the legal 
powers available to the Director to prevent abuse of a dominant position and other anti-
competitive behaviour. It has been a catalyst for the development of common carriage by 
putting incumbents at risk of abusing a dominant position if they refuse to share the use of 
their networks with potential new entrants, or offer unreasonable terms. 
Ofwat, 2000j, pp. 5–6 
In the near future, the main competitive opportunities lie in two areas: first in 
the development of common carriage arrangements. In June 2000, Severn Trent 
was the first company to put its full access code into the public domain. Since 
then, others have followed suit, and legislation is currently being discussed 
regarding a sector-specific framework to encourage the development of common English and Welsh Water and Sewerage Industry 
211 
carriage. Second, competitive opportunities lie in the establishment of a system 
of abstraction licence trading. Again, this initiative is at a relatively early stage 
of development; however, there is a commitment on the part of the Department 
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions to its implementation 
(Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000a and 2000b; 
Ofwat, 2000i). 
Beyond that, it is possible to speculate on more radical initiatives implying 
industrial restructuring. Specialist companies may emerge: network companies, 
supply companies and resource companies. Each of these could be individually 
licensed, with licences being sold on the basis of franchising arrangements. 
Time-limited Inset appointments could be offered in this way at an early stage, 
thereby increasing competitive pressure within the industry. In these and other 
ways, the regulatory burden may be lightened as competition takes root. 
Just before his retirement as Director General of Water Services, Ian Byatt 
reiterated his confidence in the competitive process. He noted also that Ofwat’s 
role must continue to evolve in response to changes in the competitive 
environment: ‘Ofwat is moving from being a regulator to also being a 
competition authority, matching the changes in the industry’ (Byatt, 2000, p. 6). 
That competition is now seen as an ally of regulation and a fact of life for water 
companies in England and Wales is due, in large part, to his personal 
commitment to the cause. 
Restructuring the Industry 
Although the regulatory functions of the RWAs were not inherited by their 
successors, the WaSCs were privatised largely intact as vertically integrated 
regional monopolies in 1989. This privatisation settlement was not as radical as 
that suggested by authors such as Vickers and Yarrow (1988): 
As a matter of general principle public policy should seek to isolate the natural monopoly 
elements and to prevent the firms entrusted with these activities from extending their 
monopoly powers into other areas. By limiting the degree of vertical integration, extensive 
use of franchising and contracting out would therefore serve to expand the domain of 
economic activity in which effective competition can be introduced. 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, p. 404 
Restructuring of the industry in the short run was effectively precluded by the 
issuing of 25-year licences and the requirement for 10 years’ notice to be given if 
these were not to be renewed. The first opportunity for such notice to be given is 
2004. 
In order to isolate natural monopoly elements of the industry and to introduce 
competition into other areas, a case may be made for breaking up the 10 WaSCs, 
first along functional lines. Littlechild (1986) noted that there were, in fact, two 
separate distribution systems — water and sewerage — which had developed Fiscal Studies 
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independently. What little empirical evidence exists on the relative performance 
of single-function and integrated suppliers suggests that the economies of scope 
derived from integration are not of decisive importance from the point of view of 
industrial structure.
22 The comparative performance of many of the WoCs in the 
English and Welsh industry over the last decade would appear to support this 
observation.
23 
Within these broad functional divisions, a further unbundling may take place. 
For water, the abstraction and treatment functions may be separated from 
distribution. For sewage, collection may be separated from treatment and 
disposal. In general, the costs of the abstraction and treatment of water and of the 
treatment and disposal of sewage are relatively low in relation to the transport 
costs for treated water and untreated sewage. The point was made in the Ofwat 
Annual Report of 1994 in relation to the bulk pricing of water: 
Ofwat does not believe that unit charges should be lower for business customers merely 
because they use a large amount of water. There are not believed to be significant 
economies of scale involved in the abstraction, storage and treatment of water. There may, 
however, be economies of distribution which relate to the delivery of large quantities of 
water to a single customer or a group of customers. 
1994 Ofwat Annual Report, p. 40 
Clearly, by dividing up previously integrated functions, there is a danger of 
dislocation and vastly increased transactions costs due to a lack of co-ordination. 
Consequently, there is a case for continuing to organise the industry under the 
integrated river basin management principle, allowing the water resource profile 
to influence industrial structure. Generally, however, sewage operations may be 
organised on a smaller, more local, scale than water, as economies of scale are 
exhausted at a lower level for sewage transportation, treatment and disposal than 
for water abstraction, treatment and distribution.  
To maximise the degree of competition within each area of the industry, the 
following steps may be taken. First, the water and sewerage networks may be 
separated from other functions, divided up along regional lines and the operating 
franchises auctioned. Given the more localised sewerage networks, the 
expectation would be for several sewerage franchisors to operate independently 
within one regional water franchisor’s area. Second, water and sewage treatment 
functions may be unbundled and management concessions for individual works 
or groups of works auctioned in a similar way. This solution would have much in 
                                                                                                                                    
22However, Hunt and Lynk (1995) (see also Lynk (1993)) found that economies of scope were sacrificed by 
separating the regulatory function from the RWAs at privatisation. The related empirical literature on the effect 
of ownership on the relative efficiency of water utilities is, however, inconclusive (see, for example, 
Bhattacharyya, Parker and Raffiee (1994) and Bruggink (1982)).  
23An overall performance assessment is given in Ofwat (1998a, Figure 1, p. 4). The two best-performing 
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common with the French concessionary system in which local municipalities 
remain ultimately responsible for services and the ultimate ownership of the 
fixed assets (Sawkins and McMaster, 1997). Third, functions such as pipeline 
construction, mains connections, maintenance and billing might also be 
separately contracted out. Given the strict environmental standards imposed on 
all aspects of the industry’s operation, any deterioration in service quality would 
be identified quickly, allowing remedial action to be taken (McMaster and 
Sawkins, 1993), the ultimate sanction being the replacement of a defaulting 
franchisor. 
All these developments would facilitate comparative competition by 
increasing the number of independent operators. There would remain a need for 
economic and environmental regulatory authorities, however, to continue to 
ensure the industry operated within statutory limits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite unpromising beginnings, the scope and extent of competition in the 
English and Welsh water industry have widened steadily during the last decade. 
Overall, progress has been slow, symptomatic of Ofwat’s legislative duty to 
facilitate rather than promote competition. Nevertheless, the Director General 
has developed the policy in the face of opposition from water companies, and 
has succeeded in securing identifiable and measurable benefits for customers, 
particularly through his operation of comparative competition.  
Working within its present statutory limits, the greatest competitive 
opportunities remain for Ofwat in the field of product market competition. This 
includes exploring the ways in which common carriage might be facilitated, 
arguing for a reduction in the Inset threshold yet further and encouraging 
potential entrants to develop and exploit new resources. An appropriate litmus 
test for the success or otherwise of this form of competition will be whether 
there is a move away from arbitrage (brokerage) arrangements to innovation in 
supply. 
At present, the industry remains highly regulated, complex and difficult to 
enter. Regulatory monitoring is extensive and burdensome, particularly for the 
smallest water companies. One of Ofwat’s outstanding challenges for the next 
decade, therefore, is to examine the means by which this regulatory burden 
might be lightened without compromising its effectiveness, and thereby 
encourage potential entrants to compete with incumbents. Contestability may 
well be an unattainable goal for the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry. Greater competition is not.  Fiscal Studies 
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